After years of considerable investment and effort Tehran’s nuclear programme is reaching an advanced status, but ignorance of suspected clandestine developments means observers simply do not know when Tehran might announce a nuclear weapon capability.  What is clear, however, is the shifting international theatre which allows Iran to take centre stage and may make Tehran nervous: (map credit https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html)

I hope this doesn't seem like a rant against Bankers.  It isn't, but it does ask some questions in my naivety regarding the financial sector.  Talented people justifiably attract appropriate salaries, but what about bonuses when they become so large to be considered excessive and incompatible with performance?  Over a military career lasting 25 years I don’t remember meeting anyone who was blatantly ‘in it’ for the money.  Yes, the money (post-Thatcher) in Britain’s Armed Forces was good and financial bonuses were occasionally offered as retention incentives, but it wasn’t money that motivated people to go to work, and it certainly wasn’t pay that made them endure the irritations of Service life, it’s hardships, or dangers.  Instead, many people were motivated by factors such as patriotism, professionalism, and a sense of duty.  Cynics might add that being unable to find a job outside the institutional bubble of military life might have kept people in, but it cannot be denied that large numbers of very talented and committed people worked very hard without excessive financial reward.  

In the pursuit of ‘joined up’ government the UK is fortunate that many government departments are closely located in a part of London called Whitehall.  Indeed, from the roof of 10 Downing Street the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Ministry of Defence (MoD) are within range of a well batted cricket ball.  As it does not take officials long to walk between key departments of state working collaboratively should be relatively simple, yet there are signs that FCO and MoD policies are not only uncoordinated but divergent.

This article has appeared at www.Defenceiq.com 

For NATO, the Libyan crisis is a welcome success.  The Alliance largely fulfilled it’s United Nations mandate to protect civilians and member states wanting Gaddafi’s removal achieved that objective.  Despite some tragic collateral incidents the 7-month military campaign was executed with unprecedented precision, no NATO personnel were killed and the intervention was successfully concluded without putting ‘boots on the ground’.  Officials in Brussels and coalition capitals may feel justifiably pleased but behind any pride or contentment should be a major concern that casts a shadow over the success of the intervention.

A shorter version of this article can be found at www.Atlantic-Community.Org 

However hard it tries, Iran will not convince outsiders that the reason for it’s nuclear programme is to supplement it’s huge oil and gas resources with atomic energy.  Instead, suspicions grow that the real purpose of the programme is to build a nuclear weapon, and why wouldn’t it be?  The Ayatollahs have noticed that none of the regimes defeated by international coalitions over the past 20 years had a nuclear weapon.  The logic is simple, once Iran is nuclear armed it will be safe from foreign invasion and imposed regime change.  As a pariah state the risks in pursuing an atomic bomb are significant, but events elsewhere suggest the prize justifies the danger.  From Tehran’s truculent perspective it would be daft not to seek a nuclear arsenal.  

(A shorter version of this article was published by the Guardian website at Comment Is Free on 4 Oct 11).

As the Libyan crisis peters out with some fragmented, yet pointless, resistance to the popular revolt against Gaddafi, it may seem obvious that the Colonel, his clan, and cronies are the vanquished, but in this chapter of history there is another ‘loser’ much closer to home - the British Army.

A copy of this article is published by DefenceIQ .  

Although it is not yet over, the NATO-led campaign in Libya is drawing to a close and interest will now grow in post-intervention reviews which look for ‘lessons learned’.  In theory, by identifying mistakes that were made, factors which shaped operations, and successful activities or decisions, NATO might enhance it’s performance in future conflicts.  In practice things are not so straightforward.

Whether it is Kennedy’s assassination, man’s first walk on the moon, or the 9/11 attacks on New York, people often remember where they were when a truly historic event took place.  On 9 September, the Today programme on BBC Radio 4 ran a story with potentially greater impact than any other event in our lifetime and yet it is unlikely that few will remember it.  

The speculation over where Colonel Gaddafi is hiding is not helped by the range of possibilities open to him.  Is he in Tripoli, Sirte, Sahba, a wilderness desert location, a foreign bolt-hole, or continually on the move?  To narrow the speculation over his whereabouts it is worth considering why he might choose one location over another, for example, what does Sirte offer the ousted dictator?  

In 25 years of military service I don’t remember ever feeling the need for an employee’s union.  There was no popular pressure to establish a union and most service personnel seemed content to keep the special occupational status their voluntary allegiance to the Crown bestowed.  The professional and moral advantages of being a wholly volunteer force were well understood and cultivated an inherent elitism perhaps absent in those nations with conscript forces which needed unions to look after their interests.  

This article dates from August 2011

Calls for the Army to be deployed on Britain’s streets to combat the shocking violence in London and elsewhere are misplaced.  The fact that the police, especially in the Metropolitan area, have been overstretched is not a justifiable excuse to send in the cavalry.  To give ordinary citizens and shop-owners etc the protection they expect requires empowering the police, not substituting them with soldiers.  

When Nato took responsibility for the military intervention in Libya it became the principal actor in shaping Libya’s future, for without the Alliance’s direct intervention rebel goals were as tangible as a desert mirage.  But following six months of coalition bombing the military balance in Libya has decisively shifted from the Gaddafi regime to rebel forces, and the cardinal player in Libya is now the Transitional National Council (TNC).  

For those opposed to the war in Afghanistan the Wikileak release of classified military reports must have seemed like a red-letter day that would fuel a widespread and accelerated opposition to the conflict.  However, ten days on and the truth is somewhat less potent.  

Anders Fogh Rasmussen has been captain of the world’s largest military alliance since August 2009, yet if he walked out of Downing Street and wandered along Whitehall to look at Nelson’s Column, the Houses of Parliament or the London Eye, he could do so anonymously.  Almost certainly, if a hundred people were asked ‘who was that who just walked by?’ the overwhelming majority would not know and if any did they would probably be tourists from Scandinavia not native Londoners (for Secretary Rasmussen had been Prime MInister of Denmark).  An imaginary situation, but does this unfamiliarity matter?  Yes, it does. 

(Image courtesy of US Defenseimagery.mil and does not imply or constitute US Department of Defense endorsement.  Please see gallery for details) Given the substantial ‘blood and treasure’ the United States has invested in Afghanistan it is unsurprising that the war there is viewed by many Americans as ‘America’s War’.  However, it would be regrettable if this perspective were to guide the White House’s handling of the conflict.  For if President Obama and his Administration do not assimilate that the war in Afghanistan is a coalition effort and lead it accordingly, the endeavour will fail.  

The annoyance Americans feel about the unwillingness of many coalition nations (mostly European) to fight the insurgents and shed blood in Afghanistan is understandable, but if America is going to steer the international intervention in Afghanistan to a successful conclusion it must show the maturity to master such frustration and accommodate differences in commitment.  Adopting an overbearing approach of ‘follow me and do as I do or I will get annoyed’ simply will not work.